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Abstract
Neo-Russellians like Salmon and Braun hold that: (A) the semantic contents of sen-
tences are structured propositions whose basic components are objects and properties,
(B) names are directly referential terms, and (C) a sentence of the form ‘n believes
that S’ is true in a context c iff the referent of the name n in c believes the proposition
expressed by S in c. This is sometimes referred to as ‘the Naive Russellian theory’.
In this talk, I will discuss the Naive Russellian theory primarily in connection with a
problem known as Schiffer’s puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle as an argument
against the Naive Russellian theory. Schiffer’s argument proceeds in two steps. In step
one, Schiffer argues that the Naive Russellian theory is committed to two principles
regarding de re belief; the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint. Then,
in step two, Schiffer argues that the special-case consequence is not consistent with
Frege’s constraint. Salmon and Braun reply to Schiffer’s argument that although the
Naive Russellian theory is committed to Frege’s constraint, it is not committed to the
special-case consequence. However, in this paper, I will arguewith a newSchiffer-case
that even if the Naive Russellian theory is not committed to the special-case conse-
quence, it is still not consistent with Frege’s constraint. Concluding, I will discuss the
possibility to reject Frege’s constraint within the Naive Russellian theory.
Keywords Schiffer’s puzzle · De re belief · Russellian propositions · Direct
reference · Proper names
1 Introduction
Following the work of Marcus (1961), Donnellan (1970), Perry (1977), Kripke (1980)
and Kaplan (1989), so-called Neo-Russellians like Salmon (1986a, b, 1989, 2006)
and Braun (1998, 2006) hold that:
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(N R1) The semantic content of a sentence S of a language L in a context c is a
Russellian proposition; i.e. a structured proposition whose basic components
are objects and properties.
(N R2) Names and other singular terms (pronouns, simple demonstratives, indexicals)
function as directly referential terms; i.e. the semantic content of ‘n is F’ in
a context c is the singular proposition 〈o,〉, where o is the referent of the
name n in c and  is the property expressed by the predicate F in c.
This is also known as the Neo-Russellian theory.1 Moreover, Salmon and Braun advo-
cate the following theory of belief reports:
(N R3) A sentence of the form ‘n believes/disbelieves that S’ is true in a context c iff
the referent of the name n in c believes/disbelieves the proposition expressed
by S in c.
The theory consisting of (N R1), (N R2) and (N R3) is sometimes referred to as ‘the
Naive Russellian theory’.2
In this paper, I will discuss the Naive Russellian theory primarily in connection with
a problem known as Schiffer’s puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle in (Schiffer
2006) as an argument against the Naive Russellian theory. Schiffer’s argument pro-
ceeds in two steps. In step one, Schiffer argues that the Naive Russellian theory is
committed to the following principles regarding de re belief, where α is any singular
term of English, β is any proper name or other directly referential term of English,
φi t is any English open sentence in which the pronoun ‘it’ occurs as a free variable –
alternatively ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘him’ or ‘her’ – and φβ is the same as φi t except for having
occurrences of β wherever φi t has free occurrences of the relevant pronoun:
The Special-Case Consequence (S): Necessarily, if α believes/disbelieves that φβ ,
then β is believed/disbelieved by α to be (some-
thing/someone) such that φi t .
Frege’s Constraint (FC): If an object o is rationally both believed and dis-
believedbyan agent k to be (something/someone)
such that φi t , then there are two modes of pre-
sentation m and m′ such that
(a) o is believedby k to be (something/someone)
such that φi t under m,
(b) o is disbelieved by k to be
(something/someone) such that φi t under m′,
and
(c) k does not recognise that m and m′ are
modes of presentation of one and the same
object.
1 As the name suggests, the Neo-Russellian theory goes back to Russell (1905, 1910–1911, 1912). How-
ever, according to Russell, the only directly referential terms are so-called logically proper names; i.e.
demonstratives like ‘this’ and ‘that’ which refer to sense-data or other objects of immediate acquaintance.
2 Note that not all Neo-Russellians accept (N R3). For example, Crimmins and Perry (1989, Crimmins
1992) hold that ‘believe’ expresses a three-place relation holding between agents, Russellian propositions
and contextually determined modes of presentation. The objection I am about to raise against the Naive
Russellian theory is not an objection to Crimmins and Perry’s theory of belief ascriptions. I will return to
this later.
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Then, in step two, Schiffer argues that together with plausible assumptions these
principles lead to contradictions. Thus, if the Naive Russellian theory were committed
to both the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint, this would refute the
Naive Russellian theory. In Sect. 2, I will discuss Schiffer’s argument in more detail.
In (Salmon 2006), Salmon agreeswith Schiffer that together with plausible assump-
tions the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint lead to contradictions.
However, Salmon replies to Schiffer’s argument that although the Naive Russellian
theory is committed to Frege’s constraint, it is not committed to (S), but only to (S′),
where α and β are again as before, ψi t is any standard English open sentence with
monadic-predicational form, ‘It’+V P , where V P is a monadic predicate3 in which
the pronoun ‘it’ does not occur free, and φβ is again the same as φi t except for having
occurrences of β wherever φi t has free occurrences of the relevant pronoun:
(S′) Necessarily, if α believes/disbelieves that ψβ , then β is believed/disbelieved by
α to be (something/someone) such that ψi t .
Since, according to Salmon, unlike the conjunction of (S) and Frege’s constraint, the
conjunction of (S′) and Frege’s constraint does not lead to contradictions, Salmon
concludes that Schiffer’s argument does not refute the Naive Russellian theory. Braun
(2006, 376) agrees with Salmon on this point.
In the first part of this paper (Sects. 2, 3, and 4), I will argue with a new Schiffer
case that, just like the conjunction of (S) and Frege’s constraint, the conjunction of
(S′) and Frege’s constraint leads to contradictions. Since, as we will see, the Naive
Russellian theory is indeed committed to (S′), it will follow that, pace Salmon and
Braun, Naive Russellians have to reject Frege’s constraint.
In (Schiffer 2006, 364–365), Schiffer notes that prima facie Naive Russellians
could reject Frege’s constraint, and, instead, accept a version of Frege’s constraint
for propositional modes of presentation; i.e. Salmon’s constraint. However, Schiffer
(2006, 365) also notes that together with plausible assumptions Salmon’s constraint
leads to a similar problem as Frege’s constraint. I will call this ‘Schiffer’s puzzle
regarding de dicto belief’. The puzzle regarding de dicto belief was first presented by
Schiffer in (Schiffer 1987, 463–466).
In the second part of this paper (Sects. 5, 6, and 7), I will argue that the new
Schiffer case also undermines Salmon’s solution to Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de
dicto belief in (Salmon 1989). Following this, I will argue with Schiffer (2006, 365–
366) that the most promising way to solve Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de dicto belief
within the Naive Russellian theory is to take the propositional modes of presentation
implied by Salmon’s constraint to be public language sentences or to be sentences in
a language of thought. However, concluding, I will argue that in connection with the
new Schiffer case taking the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s
constraint to be public language sentences or to be sentences in a language of thought
is problematic as well. It will follow that Naive Russellians have to come up with
an alternative candidate for propositional modes of presentation which (a) satisfies
Salmon’s constraint, and (b) does not lead to a similar problem as Frege’s constraint.
3 I use the term ‘monadic predicate’ as it is standardly used; i.e. as a term for predicates that assign a property
to a single argument. According to this understanding of a monadic predicate, also complex predicates like
‘met Peter in London’ count as monadic predicates.
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This will be no easy task. Before I come to the new Schiffer case, I will briefly present
Schiffer’s original puzzle.
2 Schiffer’s Puzzle
The starting point of Schiffer’s puzzle is a problem regarding de re belief which also
arises within the Naive Russellian theory. For example, both (1) and (2) can be true;
e.g. if Ralph is disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter both ‘Karol Wojtyła is
Polish’ and ‘It is not the case that John Paul II. is Polish’.
(1) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(2) Ralph disbelieves that John Paul II. is Polish.4
Moreover, it is very likely that according to the Naive Russellian theory de re belief
is simply a special case of de dicto belief (belief that): If an agent k believes de dicto
the singular proposition about o that it (he, she) is P , then it seems that o is believed
by k to be (something/someone) such that it (he, she) is P . Schiffer calls this ‘the
special-case consequence’ (Schiffer 2006, 362):
(S) Necessarily, if α believes/disbelieves that φβ , then β is believed/disbelieved by
α to be (something/someone) such that φi t .
If (1) and (2) are true, then, according to (S), so are (3) and (4).
(3) Karol Wojtyła is believed by Ralph to be (someone) such that he is Polish.
(4) John Paul II. is disbelieved by Ralph to be (someone) such that he is Polish.
Since John Paul II. = Karol Wojtyła, and since we can assume that Ralph is both a bril-
liant logician, i.e. that he is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory
beliefs, and fully rational, i.e. that he would never let contradictory beliefs pass if he
recognises them as such, this leads to the question how a brilliant logician like Ralph
can rationally both believe and disbelieve an object o to be (something/someone) such
that φi t . I will call this ‘the problem of rationality regarding de re belief’.
The received solution to the problem of rationality regarding de re belief says that
Wojtyła is presented to Ralph by two modes of presentation m and m′ without him
recognising thatm andm′ are modes of presentation of one and the same person. Since
Ralph believesWojtyła to be Polish underm and disbelievesWojtyła to be Polish under
m′, the solution continues, Ralph cannot be convicted of irrationality. Schiffer calls
this ‘Frege’s constraint’ (Schiffer 2006, 362):5
(FC) If an object o is rationally both believed and disbelieved by an agent k to be
(something/someone) such that φi t , then there are two modes of presentation
m and m′ such that
(a) o is believed by k to be (something/someone) such that φi t under m,
4 Here to disbelieve a proposition is to believe its negation.
5 Frege’s constraint leaves open what modes of presentation are, and what it is for o to be believed by k to
be (something/someone) such that φi t underm. Rather, the notion of a mode of presentation is functionally
defined by Frege’s constraint; i.e. something is a mode of presentation if it plays the role defined by Frege’s
constraint.
123
Naive Russellians and Schiffer’s Puzzle
(b) o is disbelieved by k to be (something/someone) such that φi t under m′, and
(c) k does not recognise that m and m′ are modes of presentation of one and the
same object.
Taken in its obvious intent, Frege’s constraint appears to be a self-evident truth.
For example, Salmon (2006, 370) argues that if an agent k rationally believes o to be
(something/someone) such that φi t and disbelieves o′ to be (something/someone) such
that φi t , then, in so doing, k takes o and o′ to be distinct. Insofar as k is rational, the
argument continues, he/she thereby takes o and o′ differently, even if, in fact, o = o′.
However, in (Schiffer 2006), Schiffer shows that together with plausible assumptions
the special-case consequence leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding
de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint. Thus, if the Naive Russellian theory were
committed to both the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint, this would
refute the Naive Russellian theory.
Take the above example of Ralph. From Ralph’s disposition to sincerely and reflec-
tively utter both ‘Karol Wojtyła is Polish’ and ‘It is not the case that John Paul II.
is Polish’ we infer that both (1) and (2) are true. This means that we presuppose the
following disquotational principles connecting sincere assertion and belief, where ‘S’
can be replaced, inside and outside quotation marks, by any standard English sentence
lacking indexical or pronominal devices or ambiguities (Kripke 1979, 248–249):6
(DP) If a normal English speaker is disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter ‘S’,
then he/she believes that S.
(DP ′) If a normal English speaker is disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter ‘It
is not the case that S’, then he/she disbelieves that S.
Analogous principles can be formulated for French, German etc.
Taken in their obvious intent, also (DP) and (DP ′) seem to be self-evident truths.
In particular, (DP) and (DP ′) seem to be true of belief ascriptions of the form ‘A
believes that S’. For example, if a normal English speaker sincerely and reflectively
utters ‘Ralph believes that snow iswhite’, we usually infer that the speaker believes that
Ralph believes that snow is white. Similarly, if a normal English speaker sincerely and
reflectively utters ‘It is not the case that Ralph believes that snow is white’, we usually
infer that the speaker disbelieves that Ralph believes that snow is white. Therefore,
just like Schiffer (2006), Salmon (2006), and Braun (2006), in what follows, I will
simply assume that every instance of (DP) and (DP ′) is true.
Now, Schiffer (2006, 363) notes that in the above example even a rational, normal
English speaker who believes ‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II.’ to be true could be
disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter both (1) and (5); e.g. if the speaker has
Fregean intuitions regarding the truth-values of sentences like (1) and (5).
(1) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(5) It is not the case that Ralph believes that John Paul II. is Polish.
Assume that Peter is such a speaker. Together with (DP) and (DP ′), it would follow
that both (6) and (7) are true.
6 Sentences containing indexical or pronominal devices are excluded, since, for example, from Ralph’s




(6) Peter believes that Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(7) Peter disbelieves that Ralph believes that John Paul II. is Polish.
If (6) and (7) are true, then, according to (S), so are (8) and (9).
(8) Karol Wojtyła is believed by Peter to be (someone) such that Ralph believes that
he is Polish.
(9) John Paul II. is disbelieved by Peter to be (someone) such that Ralph believes that
he is Polish.
From this, in turn, it would follow together with Frege’s constraint that Karol Wojtyła
is presented to Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these
are two modes of presentation of one and the same person. However, since Peter
believes ‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II.’ to be true, we can simply assume that Karol
Wojtyła is not presented to him by twomodes of presentation without him recognising
that these are modes of presentation of one and the same person. This is Schiffer’s
puzzle.
Schiffer’s puzzle shows that together with plausible assumptions (S) leads to
instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s con-
straint. Thus, if the Naive Russellian theory were committed to both (S) and Frege’s
constraint, Schiffer’s puzzle would refute the Naive Russellian theory. However, in
(Salmon 2006, 371–372), Salmon notes that although the Naive Russellian theory is
committed to Frege’s constraint, it is not committed to (S), but to counter-instances
of (S). Therefore, next, I will discuss Salmon’s solution to Schiffer’s puzzle in more
detail. Following this, I will argue with a new Schiffer case that even if the Naive
Russellian theory is not committed to (S), it still leads to instances of the problem of
rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint.
3 Salmon’s Solution to Schiffer’s Puzzle
One of Salmon’s examples of a counter-instance of the special-case consequence is
due toKaplan (1986, 269–272). Kaplan notes that as a rational, normal English speaker
Ralph could be disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter ‘KarolWojtyła is taller than
John Paul II.’; i.e. if Ralph does not know that ‘Karol Wojtyła’ and ‘John Paul II.’ are
names of one and the same person. Together with (DP), it would follow that (10) is
true.
(10) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is taller than John Paul II.
If (10) is true, then, according to the Naive Russellian theory, so is (11).
(11) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is taller than Karol Wojtyła.
From this, in turn, it would follow together with (S) that (12) is true.
(12) Karol Wojtyła is believed by Ralph to be something z such that z is taller than z.
However, since Ralph cannot rationally believe Karol Wojtyła to be taller than him-
self, in our example, (12) cannot be true. Thus, if the Naive Russellian theory were
committed to (S), Kaplan’s example would already refute the Naive Russellian theory
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without any reference to Frege’s constraint. However, Salmon notes that according
to the Naive Russellian theory, (11) is true if and only if Ralph believes the singu-
lar proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, Karol Wojtyła〉, taller-than〉, whereas (12) is true if
and only if Ralph believes the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being taller than
oneself〉. Since the latter proposition has to be distinguished from the former, accord-
ing to the Naive Russellian theory, there are circumstances in which (11) is true and
(12) is false.7 It follows that the Naive Russellian theory is not committed to (S), but
to counter-instances of (S).
As Salmon (2006, 371–372) rightly points out, Schiffer’s puzzle provides just
another counter-instance of (S). If (6) and (7) are true, then, according to theNaiveRus-
sellian theory, Peter both believes and disbelieves the singular proposition 〈〈Ralph,
〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉〉, believing〉. However, Peter does not thereby both
believe and disbelieve the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being (someone) such
that Ralph believes that he is Polish〉. For example, if Peter believes ‘Karol Wojtyła =
John Paul II.’ to be true, then, as a rational, normal English speaker, he is not disposed
to sincerely and reflectively utter both (13) and (14).
(13) Karol Wojtyła is (someone) such that Ralph believes that he is Polish.
(14) It is not the case that John Paul II. is (someone) such that Ralph believes that he
is Polish.
Since, according to the Naive Russellian theory, (8) is true if and only if Peter believes
the singular proposition 〈KarolWojtyła, being (someone) such that Ralph believes that
he is Polish〉, and (9) is true if and only if Peter disbelieves the singular proposition
〈Karol Wojtyła, being (someone) such that Ralph believes that he is Polish〉, it follows
that although, in the above example, both (6) and (7) are true, according to the Naive
Russellian theory, (8) or (9) is not.
Salmon (2006, 373) notes that there remains a bit of a mystery. Although the Naive
Russellian theory is not committed to (S), it is still committed to (S′), where ψi t is
any standard English open sentence with monadic-predicational form, ‘It’+V P , such
that V P is a monadic predicate in which the pronoun ‘it’ does not occur free:
(S′) Necessarily, if α believes/disbelieves that ψβ , then β is believed/disbelieved by
α to be (something/someone) such that ψi t .
As Salmon points out (2006, 371), V P is then a term for a particular property or
singulary-functional concept F . Thus, Salmon continues, if an agent believes the
singular proposition expressed by ‘It’+V P under the assignment of a particular object
o to the variable ‘it’, the proposition has the simple structure 〈o, F〉, so that the agent
indeed believes o to be F . Moreover, Salmon notes that in the above example, as
someone with Fregean intuitions, Peter could be disposed to sincerely and reflectively
utter both (15) and (16).
(15) That Karol Wojtyła is Polish is believed by Ralph.
(16) That John Paul II. is Polish is not believed by Ralph.
Together with (DP) and (DP ′), it would follow that both (17) and (18) are true.
7 See also (Salmon 1986b).
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(17) Peter believes the following: That Karol Wojtyła is Polish is believed by Ralph.
(18) Peter disbelieves the following: That John Paul II. is Polish is believed by Ralph.
However, if (17) and (18) are true, then, according to (S′), so are (19) and (20), since
the open sentence ‘it is believed by Ralph’ has monadic-predicational form.
(19) That Karol Wojtyła is Polish is believed by Peter to be something such that it is
believed by Ralph.
(20) That John Paul II. is Polish is disbelieved by Peter to be something such that it
is believed by Ralph.
Since, according to theNaiveRussellian theory, both the proposition thatKarolWojtyła
is Polish and the proposition that John Paul II. is Polish are the singular proposition
〈KarolWojtyła, being Polish〉, togetherwith Frege’s constraint, it would follow that the
singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 is presented to Peter by two modes
of presentation without him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one
and the same proposition. But, since neither Karol Wojtyła nor the property of being
Polish is presented to Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising
that these are modes of presentation of one and the same object/property, for a Naive
Russellian, the question remains, how 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 can be presented
to Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these are modes
of presentation of one and the same proposition. I will call this ‘Schiffer’s puzzle for
propositions’.
Salmon (2006, 373–374) solves Schiffer’s puzzle for propositions by arguing that
Peter can mistake the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 for two inde-
pendent thoughts without taking one of its basic components in two different ways.
For example, according to Salmon, if Peter has Fregean intuitions, then he mistakes
the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 for the Fregean thought 〈mKW ,
being Polish〉 and for the Fregean thought 〈m′KW , being Polish〉, where mKW and
m′KW are Ralph’s modes of presentation of Karol Wojtyła. According to the Naive
Russellian theory, this is amisconception. However, as Salmon puts it, “misconceiving
is a way of taking” (Salmon 2006, 374).
So far, one may agree with Salmon. However, next, I will argue that there are
instances of Schiffer’s puzzle for propositions where the agent does not take the
proposition in question for two independent thoughts. It will follow that, just like
(S), (S′) leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief that
violate Frege’s constraint.
4 A New Schiffer Case
Let us assume that Harry is a rational, normal English speaker who believes that the
that-clause in (1) and (15) and the that-clause in (5) and (16) designate one and the
same proposition. Nevertheless, Harry could be disposed to sincerely and reflectively
utter both (1) and (5); i.e. if he shares the intuitions of Neo-Russellians like Crimmins
and Perry (Crimmins and Perry 1989; Crimmins 1992). Although these philosophers
believe that the that-clause in (1) and the that-clause in (5) designate one and the same
proposition, they have strong intuitions that there can be circumstances in which both
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(1) and (5) are true. Moreover, if Harry shares the intuitions of Neo-Russellians like
Crimmins and Perry, as a rational, normal English speaker, he could even be disposed
to sincerely and reflectively utter both (15) and (16); e.g. if he wants to explain to
someone why Ralph does not speak Polish when he meets the Pope, although he is
a childhood friend of him. Together with (DP) and (DP ′), it would follow that both
(21) and (22) are true.
(21) Harry believes the following: That Karol Wojtyła is Polish is believed by Ralph.
(22) Harry disbelieves the following: That John Paul II. is Polish is believed by Ralph.
If (21) and (22) are true, then, according to (S′), so are (23) and (24).
(23) That Karol Wojtyła is Polish is believed by Harry to be something such that it is
believed by Ralph.
(24) That John Paul II. is Polish is disbelieved by Harry to be something such that it
is believed by Ralph.
Moreover, since, according to the Naive Russellian theory, the proposition that Karol
Wojtyła is Polish is the proposition that John Paul II. is Polish, if (24) is true, then,
according to the Naive Russellian theory, so is (25).
(25) That Karol Wojtyła is Polish is disbelieved by Harry to be something such that
it is believed by Ralph.
From (23) and (25), in turn, it would follow together with Frege’s constraint that
the proposition that Karol Wojtyła is Polish is presented to Harry by two modes of
presentation without him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one and
the same proposition. However, sinceHarry believes that the that-clause in (15) and the
that-clause in (16) designate one and the same proposition, we can simply assume that
the proposition that Karol Wojtyła is Polish is not presented to Harry by two modes of
presentation without him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one and
the same proposition. Thus, even together with (S′), the Naive Russellian theory leads
to instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s
constraint.
The obvious solution to this version of Schiffer’s puzzle seems to be that in the
above example Harry neither believes nor disbelieves the singular proposition 〈〈Karol
Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉, but that he rather believes some-
thing along the lines of the singular proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being
believed by Ralph under m〉 and disbelieves something along the lines of the singular
proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph underm′〉, where
m andm′ are two distinct ways the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉
is presented to Ralph. From this, the solution continues, together with (S′), it would
only follow that the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 is believed by
Harry to be something such that under m it is believed by Ralph and disbelieved by
Harry to be something such that under m′ it is believed by Ralph, and not that the
singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 is both believed and disbelieved
by Harry to be something such that it is believed by Ralph. However, such a solution
is not available to the Naive Russellians. According to (N R3), both in ‘That Karol
Wojtyła is Polish is believed by Ralph’ and in ‘That John Paul II. is Polish is believed
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by Ralph’ ‘believe’ expresses a two-place relation holding between agents and Rus-
sellian propositions. Therefore, according to the Naive Russellian theory, (21) is true
if and only if Harry believes the singular proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉,
being believed by Ralph〉, and (22) is true if and only if Harry disbelieves the singular
proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉. Together with
(S′), it would follow that the singular proposition 〈KarolWojtyła, being Polish〉 is both
believed and disbelieved by Harry to be something such that it is believed by Ralph.
Naive Russellians could respond that although, as a normal English speaker who
shares the intuitions of Crimmins and Perry, Harry could be disposed to sincerely and
reflectively utter both (1) and (5), the same is not true of (15) and (16). But I see no
reason why a rational, normal English speaker who has strong intuitions that there can
be circumstances in which both (1) and (5) are true should be immune to think the
same of (15) and (16)? According to Naive Russellians, the speaker would bemistaken
either way, but in neither case this seems to preclude that normal English speakers
sometimes have these intuitions. Moreover, it does not seem to make any difference
whether Harry uses (1) and (5) or (15) and (16) for his explanation of why Ralph does
not speak Polish with the Pope.
Finally, Naive Russellians could try to solve the new Schiffer case by claiming that
according to the Naive Russellian theory Harry does not count as a normal English
speaker with respect to (15) and (16), and that, therefore, according to the Naive
Russellian theory, fromHarry’s sincere and reflective utterances of (15) and (16) it does
not follow togetherwith (DP) and (DP ′) that both (21) and (22) are true.8 For example,
an advocate of the Naive Russellian theory could argue that according to the Naive
Russellian theory Harry does not take (15) and (16) to express the very propositions
that they in fact express. Otherwise, the argument goes, since Harry believes that the
that-clause in (15) and the that-clause in (16) designate one and the same proposition,
he would notice that (15) and (16) express contradictory propositions. However, since,
in the above example, it is not assumed that the Naive Russellian theory is true, but
rather that Harry believes that the that-clauses in (15) and (16) express one and the
same proposition, from the fact that according to the Naive Russellian theory Harry
does not count as a normal English speaker with respect to (15) and (16), it does not
follow that, in the world of the example, Harry does not count as a normal English
speaker with respect to (15) and (16), and only the latter would block the steps to (21)
and (22). Moreover, the intuitions of Neo-Russellians like Crimmins and Perry show
that even normal English speakers who believe that the that-clauses in (15) and (16)
designate one and the same proposition can have strong intuitions that there can be
circumstances in which both (15) and (16) are true. Thus, if, according to the Naive
Russellian theory, such speakers would not count as normal English speakers when
it comes to sentences like (15) and (16), this would by itself undermine the Naive
Russellian theory.
We see that the new Schiffer case shows that even together with (S′) the Naive
Russellian theory leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief
that violate Frege’s constraint. Since the Naive Russellian theory is indeed committed
to (S′), it follows that, pace Salmon (2006) and Braun (2006), Naive Russellians have
8 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this objection out to me.
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to reject Frege’s constraint. In (Schiffer 2006, 364–365), Schiffer notes that prima
facie Naive Russellians could reject Frege’s constraint, and, instead, accept a version
of Frege’s constraint for propositional modes of presentation. Therefore, next, I will
discuss Schiffer’s proposal in more detail. In this connection, we will see that Frege’s
constraint for propositional modes of presentation leads to a similar problem as (FC);
i.e. Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de dicto belief.
5 Schiffer’s Puzzle RegardingDeDicto Belief
Naive Russellians not only have to explain how a brilliant logician like Ralph can
rationally both believe and disbelieve Karol Wojtyła to be Polish. They also have to
explain how a brilliant logician like Ralph can rationally both believe and disbelieve
the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉. I will call this ‘the problem
of rationality regarding de dicto belief’. In order to solve the problem of rationality
regarding de dicto belief, in addition to Frege’s constraint, Naive Russellians also
accept a version of Frege’s constraint for propositional modes of presentation:9
(SC) If a proposition p is rationally both believed and disbelieved by an agent k, then
there are two modes of presentation m and m′ such that
(a) p is believed by k under m,
(b) p is disbelieved by k under m′, and
(c) k (rationally) takesm andm′ to be modes of presentation of distinct propo-
sitions.
I will call this ‘Salmon’s constraint’. Following Salmon’s constraint, NaiveRussellians
would argue that in the above example the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being
Polish〉 is presented to Ralph by two modes of presentation without him recognising
that these are modes of presentation of one and the same proposition. Since Ralph
believes the proposition under one mode of presentation and disbelieves it under the
other, the explanation goes, Ralph cannot be convicted of irrationality.
Now, Schiffer (2006, 364–365) notes that since Naive Russellians already accept
Salmon’s constraint for propositional modes of presentation, prima facie, they could
simply reject Frege’s constraint. For example, following Salmon’s constraint, Naive
Russellians could claim that although the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being
Polish〉 is not presented to Harry by two modes of presentation without him recognis-
ing that these are modes of presentation of one and the same proposition, the singular
proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉 is still presented
to him by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these are modes
of presentation of one and the same proposition. Since Harry believes the proposition
under one mode of presentation and disbelieves it under the other, the solution con-
tinues, Harry cannot be convicted of irrationality. However, Schiffer (2006, 365) also
notes that together with plausible assumptions Salmon’s constraint leads to a similar
problem as Frege’s constraint.
According to Schiffer, prima facie, the only reasonable construal of the proposi-
tional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint is that they are structured
9 See, for example, (Salmon 1986a).
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entities whose basic components are modes of presentation of the basic components
of the Russellian propositions of which the propositional modes of presentation are
modes of presentation:
(A) If an agent k believes/disbelieves a proposition p under amode of presentationm,
then m is a structured entity whose basic components are modes of presentation
of the basic components of p.
Moreover, it is very likely that according to such a construal of the propositionalmodes
of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint something like Frege’s constraint holds
for the basic components of the Russellian propositions of which the propositional
modes of presentation are modes of presentation:
(B) If an agent k believes a proposition p under a mode of presentationm, disbelieves
p under a mode of presentation m′, and rationally takes m and m′ to be modes
of presentation of distinct propositions, then there is a basic component x of p
such that x is presented to k by two modes of presentation m and m′ without
k recognising that m and m′ are modes of presentation of one and the same
object/property.
For example, if k believes the singular proposition 〈o, F〉 under the structured mode of
presentation 〈mo,mF 〉, where mo is a mode of presentation of the object o and mF is
a mode of presentation of the property F , and disbelieves the singular proposition 〈o,
F〉 under the structured mode of presentation 〈m′o,m′F 〉, where m′o is again a mode of
presentation of the object o andm′F is again a mode of presentation of the property F ,
then it seems that even if 〈mo,mF 〉 = 〈m′o,m′F 〉, k cannot rationally take 〈mo,mF 〉
and 〈m′o,m′F 〉 to be modes of presentation of distinct propositions if k believes both
mo = m′o and mF = m′F to be true. However, even in the example of Peter, none
of the basic components of the singular proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being
Polish〉〉, believing〉 is presented to Peter by two modes of presentation without him
recognising that these are modes of presentation of one and the same object/property.
Thus, together with (B) and Salmon’s constraint, it would follow that Peter does not
rationally both believe and disbelieve the singular proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈KarolWojtyła,
being Polish〉〉, believing〉. However, as we have seen above, Naive Russellians are
committed to the claim that Peter rationally both believes and disbelieves the singular
proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉〉, believing〉. This is Schiffer’s
puzzle regarding de dicto belief.10
In order to solve Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de dicto belief, NaiveRussellians either
have to show that (A) does not commit them to (B), or they have to reject (A) and
10 In his formulation of the puzzle, Schiffer uses the following principle:
(B*) If an agent k believes a proposition p under a mode of presentation m and disbelieves p under a
different mode of presentation m′ without k recognising that m and m′ are modes of presentation
of one and the same proposition, then there is a basic component x of p such that x is presented to
k by two modes of presentation m′′ and m′′′ without k recognising that m′′ and m′′′ are modes of
presentation of one and the same object/property.
However, as the discussion of (B) shows, even if (A) is true, (B*) is not, since an irrational agent could,
for example, take 〈mo,mF 〉 and 〈m′o,m′F 〉 to be modes of presentation of distinct propositions even if
he believes both mo = m′o and mF = m′F to be true. Therefore, in order to formulate Schiffer’s puzzle
regarding de dicto belief, we have to add that the agent is rational.
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give an alternative construal of the propositional modes of presentation implied by
Salmon’s constraint that does not commit them to (B). In (Schiffer 2006), Schiffer
discusses the first possibility, whereas, in (Salmon 1989) and (Salmon 2006), Salmon
seems to suggest the second possibility. I will start with Salmon’s proposal.
6 Salmon’s Solution to the Puzzle RegardingDeDicto Belief
Schiffer first presented the puzzle regarding de dicto belief in (Schiffer 1987, 463–
466). Arguably, the puzzle regarding de dicto belief and the puzzle regarding de re
belief are simply two versions of one and the same puzzle. This is why, in (Salmon
1989, 267–268), Salmon can solve the puzzle regarding de dicto belief in a similar
way as Schiffer’s puzzle for propositions. According to Salmon, Peter can believe
the singular proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉〉, believing〉 without
thinking of Karol Wojtyła or the property of being Polish in a certain way; e.g. if
he mistakes the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 for a Fregean
thought. Thus, according to Salmon, if Peter rationally both believes and disbelieves
the singular proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉〉, believing〉, he can
mistake the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 for two independent
thoughts without taking one of its basic components in two different ways. Moreover,
in so doing, Peter could take the singular proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being
Polish〉〉, believing〉 in two different wayswithout taking one of its basic components in
two different ways. Therefore, if Salmon is right, Salmon’s constraint neither commits
Naive Russellians to (A) nor to (B).
Even if Salmon’s constraint does not commit Naive Russellians to (A), it seems to
commit them to something along the lines of (A′):11
(A′) If an agent k believes/disbelieves a singular proposition with the simple structure
〈o, F〉 under a mode of presentation m, then m is a structured entity 〈mo,mF 〉,
where mo is a mode of presentation of the object o and mF is a mode of presen-
tation of the property F .
For example, if an agent believes/disbelieves the singular proposition 〈〈KarolWojtyła,
being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉, it seems that even according to Salmon he
thereby thinks of both the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 and the
property of being believed by Ralph in a certain way. Moreover, according to such a
construal of the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint,
something like Frege’s constraint seems to hold for the components of the singular
propositions of which these structured propositional modes of presentation are modes
of presentation:
(B ′) If an agent k believes a singular propositionwith the simple structure 〈o, F〉 under
a mode of presentation m, disbelieves 〈o, F〉 under a mode of presentation m′,
and rationally takesm andm′ to bemodes of presentation of distinct propositions,
then
11 Note that although (A′) does not commit Naive Russellians to (A), (A′) is consistent with (A).
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(a) the object o is presented to k by twomodes of presentationm andm′ without
him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one and the same object,
or
(b) the property F is presented to k by two modes of presentation m and m′
without him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one and the
same property.
For example, as we have seen above, if k believes the singular proposition 〈o, F〉 under
the structuredmode of presentation 〈mo,mF 〉, and disbelieves the singular proposition
〈o, F〉 under the structured mode of presentation 〈m′o,m′F 〉, then it seems that even if〈mo,mF 〉 = 〈m′o,m′F 〉, k cannot rationally take 〈mo,mF 〉 and 〈m′o,m′F 〉 to be modes
of presentation of distinct propositions if k believes bothmo = m′o andmF = m′F to be
true.However, just like the conjunction of (B) andSalmon’s constraint, the conjunction
of (B ′) and Salmon’s constraint is not consistent with the Naive Russellian theory.
Take again the example of Harry. Since the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła,
being Polish〉 is not presented to Harry by two modes of presentation without him
recognising that these are modes of presentation of one and the same proposition, in
the example of Harry, neither the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉
nor the property of being believed by Ralph is presented to Harry by two modes
of presentation without him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one
and the same object/property. Thus, together with (B ′) and Salmon’s constraint, it
would follow that Harry does not rationally both believe and disbelieve the singular
proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉. However, as
we have seen above, again, Naive Russellians are committed to the claim that Harry
rationally both believes and disbelieves the singular proposition 〈〈KarolWojtyła, being
Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉.
Naive Russellians could respond that although in the example of Harry the singular
proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 is not presented to Harry by two modes of
presentation without him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one and
the same proposition, the same is not true of the property of being believed by Ralph.
For example, Naive Russellians could argue that in the example of Harry the property
of being believed by Ralph is presented to Harry both as the property of being believed
by Ralph under m and as the property of being believed by Ralph under m′, where m
and m′ are two distinct ways the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉
is presented to Ralph. However, if Harry mistakes the property of being believed by
Ralph for the property of being believed by Ralph under m, then it is very likely that
Harry does not ascribe to 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 the property of being believed
by Ralph, but the property of being believed by Ralph underm; i.e. that Harry does not
both believe and disbelieve the singular proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉,
being believed by Ralph〉, but that he rather believes the singular proposition 〈〈Karol
Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph underm〉 and disbelieves the singular
proposition 〈〈KarolWojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph underm′〉. Again,
this is the obvious solution to the new Schiffer case. However, as we have seen above,
such a solution to the new Schiffer case is not available to Naive Russellians.
At this point,NaiveRusselliansmay opt for the second possibility to solve Schiffer’s
puzzle regarding de dicto belief, i.e. to show that (B) does not follow from (A) (or
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that (B ′) does not follow from (A′)). According to Schiffer (2006, 365–366), the most
promisingway to accept (A)without being committed to (B) is to take the propositional
modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint to be public language sentences
or to be sentences in a language of thought. In the next section, I will argue that the
same is true of (A′) and (B ′). However, concluding, I will argue that in connection
with the new Schiffer case taking the propositional modes of presentation implied by
Salmon’s constraint to be public language sentences or to be sentences in a language
of thought is problematic as well.
7 Propositional Modes of Presentation as Sentences
According to a sententialist view of the propositionalmodes of presentation implied by
Salmon’s constraint, the singular proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉〉,
believing〉 is presented to Peter both as the proposition expressed by (1) and as the
proposition expressed by (26) (or as the proposition expressed by a Mentalese trans-
lation of (1) and (26) (respectively)).12
(1) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(26) Ralph believes that John Paul II. is Polish.
First of all, this would preserve (A), since sentences are structured entities whose
basic components are expressions designating the basic components of the Russellian
propositions expressed by them. Moreover, Schiffer (2006, 365–366) notes that even
if Peter believes ‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II.’ to be true, he may still rationally take
(1) and (26) to express distinct propositions; e.g. if Peter has Fregean intuitions. There-
fore, according to Schiffer, taking the propositional modes of presentation implied by
Salmon’s constraint to be public language sentences or to be sentences in a language of
thought would be a way for Naive Russellians to accept (A) without being committed
to (B).
Prima facie, it would also be a way for Naive Russellians to accept (A′) without
being committed to (B ′). For example, Naive Russellians could argue that even if
12 For a discussion of a sententialist view of the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s
constraint see (Braun 1998). The view that propositional modes of presentation are sentences in a natural
language seems to be most plausible if the natural language sentences only individuate the propositional
modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint without equating the two.Moreover, both Schiffer and
Braun prefer the version according to which the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s
constraint are sentences in a thinker’s language of thought, since it applies without finagling to unexpressed
beliefs.
Prof. Braun has informed me (in personal correspondence) that although he finds the view according to
which the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint are sentences in a language of
thought plausible, he does not fully commit himself to this view, because he does not fully commit himself
to the view that there is something like a language of thought. However, he would say that the propositional
modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint are structured entities in the way described in (A′).
Note that although the sentences of a speaker’s public language are abstract entities, the same is, arguably,
not true of the sentences of a speaker’s language of thought. For example, according to Braun (1998), the
sentences of a thinker’s language of thought are realised in his head and bear causal roles with respect
to each other. Nevertheless, according to Braun, just like sentences of a public language, these mental
sentences express propositions because of their structures and because their constituents refer to individuals
and express properties and relations.
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Harry believes that the that-clause in (15) and the that-clause in (16) designate one
and the same proposition, he may still rationally take (15) and (27) to express distinct
propositions; i.e. if he shares the intuitions of Neo-Russellians like Crimmins and
Perry.
(15) That Karol Wojtyła is Polish is believed by Ralph.
(27) That John Paul II. is Polish is believed by Ralph.
However, for an advocate of a sententialist view, the question remains, how a rational,
normal English speaker like Harry can take (15) and (27) (or their Mentalese trans-
lations) to express distinct propositions, although, according to the Naive Russellian
theory, both (15) and (27) express the singular proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being
Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉. I will call this ‘the problem of normal speakers’.
The problem of normal speakers is a problem Naive Russellians have to solve
anyway. However, I will argue that within a sententialist view of the propositional
modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint the standard Naive Russellian
solutions to the problem of normal speakers are not an option. This will suggest that,
ultimately, a sententialist view of the propositional modes of presentation implied by
Salmon’s constraint does not provide a solution to the problem of normal speakers, and
that, therefore, a sententialist view of the propositional modes of presentation implied
by Salmon’s constraint is not an option for Naive Russellians.
According to a sententialist view,Harry can rationally believe and disbelieve the sin-
gular proposition 〈〈KarolWojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉 because he
believes the proposition via (15) (or its Mentalese translation), disbelieves the propo-
sition via (27) (or its Mentalese translation), and rationally takes (15) and (27) to
express distinct propositions. As said above, such a solution to the problem of ratio-
nality regarding de dicto belief leads to the question, howHarry can rationally take (15)
and (27) (or their Mentalese translations) to express distinct propositions, although,
according to the Naive Russellian theory, both (15) and (27) express the singular
proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉. Naive Russel-
lians standardly solve this problem by claiming that althoughHarry takes both (15) and
(27) to express the singular proposition 〈〈KarolWojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed
by Ralph〉, he does so under distinct modes of presentation, m and m′, without him
recognising that these aremodes of presentation of one and the same proposition.13 But
thenm andm′ would, ultimately, explain how Harry can rationally accept (15) and the
negation of (27), viz. (16), although, according to the Naive Russellian theory, the two
sentences express contradictory propositions; i.e.m andm′ would, ultimately, explain
how Harry can rationally believe and disbelieve the singular proposition 〈〈Karol Woj-
tyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉, and not (15) and (27) (or their Mentalese
translations). Since this contradicts a sententialist view of the propositional modes of
presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint, sententialists have to provide an alterna-
tive solution to the problem of normal speakers.
In order to solve the problem of normal speakers, Naive Russellians sometimes
claim that althoughboth (15) and (27) express the singular proposition 〈〈KarolWojtyła,
being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉, even a normal English speaker like Harry
13 See for example (Braun 1998).
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could take (15) to express a proposition p and (27) to express a proposition q such
that p = q; i.e. if the speaker mistakes certain pragmatic implications of (15) and (27)
regarding the way Ralph believes 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉 for their semantic
implications.14 However, if Harry does not take both (15) and (27) to express the
singular proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉, it is
very unclear how he can believe the proposition via (15) and disbelieve the proposition
via (27) as a sententialist view of the propositional modes of presentation implied
by Salmon’s constraint claims. This suggests that within a sententialist view also a
pragmatic solution to the problem of normal speakers is not an option.
An advocate of a sententialist view of the propositional modes of presentation
implied by Salmon’s constraint could claim that Harry can rationally take (15) and (27)
(or their Mentalese translations) to express distinct propositions because for Harry the
two sentences have different inferential properties. However, since, in addition to (15)
and (16), Harry also accepts (28) (or its Mentalese translation), it is very unclear how
Naive Russellians could explain that for Harry (15) and (27) have different inferential
properties.
(28) (The proposition) that Karol Wojtyła is Polish = (the proposition) that John Paul
II. is Polish.
According to the Naive Russellian theory, (15) is a simple logical consequence of (27)
and (28); i.e. it follows from (27) and (28) by substitution of identicals. Similarly,
according to the Naive Russellian theory, (27) is a simple logical consequence of (15)
and (28). Therefore, since we can simply assume that Harry is a brilliant logician who
is familiar with the substitution of identicals, according to the Naive Russellian theory,
for Harry, (15) and (27) should have the same inferential properties; i.e. according to
a inferentialist solution to the problem of normal speakers, Harry should take (15) and
(27) to express one and the same proposition.
Naive Russellians could respond that Harry takes (15) and (27) (or their Mentalese
translations) to express distinct propositions because for Harry the two sentences have
different causal properties.15 According to such a solution, although Harry accepts
(28), the two sentences (15) and (27), nevertheless, have different causal properties
in Harry’s mind; i.e. while the latter may cause him to think of a pope, the former
may not. However, since Harry is both a brilliant logician and fully rational, it is very
unclear how (15) and (27) can have different causal properties in Harry’s mind if for
Harry the two sentences are logically equivalent. Moreover, even if the two sentences
had different causal properties in Harry’s mind, it is still not clear that this would be
sufficient for Harry to take (15) and (27) to express distinct propositions. For example,
it seems that even for a speaker who knows that ‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II.’ is true
the two sentences (29) and (30) can have different causal properties, since the latter
may cause the speaker to think of a Polish pope, whereas the former may not.
(29) Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(30) John Paul II. is Polish.
14 See for example (Salmon 1986a).
15 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this possibility out to me.
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However, since the speaker knows that ‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II’ is true, this
would not be sufficient for him to take (29) and (30) to express distinct propositions.
Thus, in order to solve the problem of normal speakers, an advocate of a causal solution
would have to provide a more detailed account of what it means for two sentences to
have different causal properties. Since no such solution has been well-elaborated in
the literature, yet, I have to leave a more detailed discussion of a causal solution to the
problem of normal speakers for future work.
We see that within a sententialist view of the propositional modes of presenta-
tion implied by Salmon’s constraint the standard solutions to the problem of normal
speakers are not an option. Moreover, neither the inferentialist solution nor the causal
solution seems to provide a solution to the problem of normal speakers when it comes
to the new Schiffer case. This suggests that, ultimately, a sententialist view of the
propositional modes of presentation implied Salmon’s constraint does not provide a
solution to the problem of normal speakers. Thus, it seems that Naive Russellians
have to come up with an alternative candidate for the propositional modes of presen-
tation implied by Salmon’s constraint which (a) satisfies (A) (or (A′)), and (b) does
not commit them to (B) or (B ′). Since no such candidate seems to be available, this
undermines the Naive Russellian theory.
8 Conclusion
Let us recap: The new Schiffer case shows that even together with (S′) the Naive
Russellian theory leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re
belief that violate Frege’s constraint. Since the Naive Russellian theory is indeed
committed to (S′), it follows that, pace Salmon and Braun, Naive Russellians have to
reject Frege’s constraint. Schiffer notes that prima facie Naive Russellians could reject
Frege’s constraint, and, instead, accept a version of Frege’s constraint for propositional
modes of presentation; i.e. Salmon’s constraint. However, Schiffer also notes that
together with (A) and (B) Salmon’s constraint leads to a similar problem as Frege’s
constraint. This was Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de dicto belief. The new Schiffer case
shows that, pace Salmon, the solution to Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de dicto belief
cannot simply be to reject (A) and (B), and, instead, accept (A′) and (B ′). Rather, Naive
Russellians have to come up with a candidate for propositional modes of presentation
which (a) satisfies (A) (or (A′)), and (b) does not commit them to (B) or (B ′). ForNaive
Russellians, the most promising way to accept (A) and (A′) without being committed
to neither (B) nor (B ′) is to claim that the propositional modes of presentation implied
by Salmon’s constraint are public language sentences or sentences in a language of
thought. However, for Naive Russellians, such a sententalist view of the propositional
modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint leads to the problem, howHarry
can rationally take (15) and (27) (or their Mentalese translations) to express distinct
propositions, although he believes that the that-clause in (15) and the that-clause in
(27) designate one and the same proposition. Since it is very unclear how an advocate
of a sententialist view of the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s
constraint could explain this, it seems that Naive Russellians have to come up with an
alternative candidate for the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s
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constraintwhich (a) satisfies (A) (or (A′)), and (b) does not commit them to (B) or (B ′).
Since no such candidate seems to be available, this undermines the Naive Russellian
theory.
At this point, a possible way out for Naive Russellians could be to reject both (A)
and (A′). For example, Naive Russellians could claim that the propositional modes of
presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint are simple, unstructured entities. How-
ever, although such a proposal is not ruled out by the arguments presented in this
paper, there is also no well-elaborated theory of such simple propositional modes of
presentation in the literature. Therefore, it is very unclear, whether such a proposal
would, ultimately, provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. I will leave a more detailed
discussion of simple, unstructured propositional modes of presentation in connection
with Schiffer’s puzzle for future work.
Finally, note that neither Schiffer’s original puzzle nor the new version of Schif-
fer’s puzzle presented in this paper is a problem for the Neo-Russellian theory in
general. For example, although Crimmins and Perry (1989; Crimmins 1992) accept
(N R1) and (N R2), they reject (N R3), and, instead, hold that ‘believe’ expresses a
three-place relation holding between agents, Russellian propositions and contextually
determined modes of presentation. Therefore, Crimmins and Perry could claim that in
the new Schiffer case Harry neither believes nor disbelieves the singular proposition
〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph〉, but that he rather believes
something along the lines of the singular proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉,
being believed by Ralph under m〉 and disbelieves something along the lines of the
singular proposition 〈〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉, being believed by Ralph under
m′〉, where m and m′ are two distinct ways the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła,
being Polish〉 is presented to Ralph. Since, as we have seen above, such a solution
to the new Schiffer case is not available to the Naive Russellians, in connection with
the new Schiffer case, Crimmins and Perry’s version of the Neo-Russellian theory is
preferable to the Naive Russellian theory advocated by Salmon and Braun.
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